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ARTICLES
THE EFFECT OF PALAZZOLO v. RHODE ISLAND ON
TAKINGS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAND USE
REGULATION
Mark W. Cordes*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision last term in Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island' is the latest in a series of cases over the past fifteen years
in which the Court has ventured into the notoriously murky area
of federal takings law. As has been true with most of these recent decisions, 2 Palazzolo, at least on its face, appears to be a significant victory for property owners, adding to the already
growing perception that the Court is intent on expanding pri3
vate property rights at the expense of environmental protection.
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. J.S.M., Stanford University School of Law; J.D., Willamette University; M.A., Fuller Theological
Seminary; B.S., Portland State University.

The author would like to thank Peter
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1. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
2. Several recent Supreme Court takings decisions have held for property
owners. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S.
687 (1999) (concluding that repeated denials of development requests constituted a
taking); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (establishing "rough proportionality" standard for development exactions); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1020 (1992) (finding that a regulation depriving a landowner
of all "economically viable" use of property constitutes a taking); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (requiring "essential nexus" between
exactions and development impacts); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (requiring just compensation for the period between the enactment of a regulation and the final judicial determination that
a taking has occurred).
3. See, e.g., Marilyn Phelan, The Current Status of Historical Preservation Law in
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence:Has the Lucas "Missile" Dismantled Preservation Programs? 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 785, 787 (1995) (Dolan and Lucas "raise questions
whether the Court has indeed adopted a more expansive course" in its takings
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Indeed, some initial responses to Palazzolo from the property
rights movement have been near ecstatic, declaring it to be a
"landmark victory," a "vindication of past efforts," and "terribly
4
important" for property rights.
The core issue decided in Palazzolo, and the one causing the
greatest environmental alarm, is whether notice of a regulation
when property is acquired precludes a takings claim.5 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court in Palazzolo v. State stated that regardless of the economic impact on the property, a takings claim
was precluded because the claimant was aware of the restriction
at the time he acquired the property. 6 This decision in fact reflected a position frequently taken by lower courts, which often
reject takings claims when property owners are aware of restrictions at the time the property is purchased. 7 Whether viewed as
an issue of notice or negating investment-backed expectations,
the final result has been the same: if the challenged restriction
existed when the property was acquired, the current owner
could not succeed in a takings claim.
The Supreme Court rejected this position in Palazzolo, holding that notice of a regulation when property is acquired does
not preclude a takings claim.8 In so holding, the Court largely
emphasized the rights of the owner at the time of regulation,
rather than those of the actual claimant. 9 To hold otherwise
analysis that might have a profound impact on historic preservation programs);
John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLUM.

J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (1993) (stating the possible effect of Lucas is to stunt legislative protection against harmful land uses); Daniel A. Crane, Comment, Poor Relation? Regulatory Takings After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 199, 201 (1996) ("[Tihe
Rehnquist Court has begun to reinvigorate the Takings Clause, much to the joy of
property rights activists and to the dismay of environmentalists."). See also Hope M.
Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of Takings Jurisprudence? The Impact ofLucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands and Coastal
Barrier Beaches, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4 n.12 (1995) ("The rhetoric of the majority's language, ... and the obvious effort in the majority's decision to let Lucas win
all send strong pro-property rights signals to lower courts.").
4. See John D. Echeverria, A PreliminaryAssessment of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 11112 (Sept. 2001) (providing an early and

helpful assessment of Palazzolo from a leading environmental attorney); James S.
Burling et. al., Supreme Court Rejects Notice Defense, Remands Takings Case to R. I.
High Court, 32 ENVT. RPTR. 1331-33 (July 6, 2001).

5. See 533 U.S. at 626-32.
6. See Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000) [hereinafter, Palazzolo I],
affd in part, and remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
7. See infra Part I.B.

8. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626-30.
9. See id.
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would in effect punish sellers of property who owned it when a
restriction was enacted, since any purchaser would take the
property subject to the restriction and be barred from a takings
claim. As viewed by the Court, a contrary outcome would substantially interfere with a landowner's right to transfer the property interest prior to regulation.' 0
On this core issue, Palazzolo was arguably a victory for
property rights proponents, and concomitantly, a setback for
protection of environmentally sensitive lands.11 However, a
closer reading of the decision suggests that the victory is more
limited than one might first imagine and, in some respects, actually quite supportive of most environmental controls. 12 Not only
does the decision clearly affirm the current two-fold regulatory
takings test derived from Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council' 3
and Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City, 14 but it applies that test in two ways supportive of government regulatory
efforts. First, the Court affirmed in Palazzolo that categorical
takings under Lucas, in which a property owner has been denied
all economic viability, are limited to very extreme situations, rejecting such a claim in Palazzolo where the property suffered a
large diminution in value but retained some modest economic
viability.15 This holding affirms previous understandings that
even extremely large economic impacts will not be a categorical
taking,16 giving regulators substantial authority to pursue a variety of environmental controls.
Second, although the Court reiterated that even when economic viability remains a taking might still occur under the Penn
Central test,' 7 a close reading of Palazzolo indicates that knowledge of a restriction-while not precluding a claim under Penn
Central-can be considered in applying the investment-backed
10. See id. at 627-28.
11. See Echeverria, supra note 4, at 11115.

12. See id. (suggesting that although Palazzolo was a property rights victory, it
may "come to represent an important precedent regarding the legitimacy of substantial land use restrictions").
13. 505 U.S. 1003 (holding that taking occurs if regulation denies landowner all

economically viable use of property).
14. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (applying a
balancing test in examiningthe character of government action, economic impact,
and interference with investment-backed expectations).
15. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630.
16. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1997) (stat-

ing that a diminution in value alone does not establish a taking).
17. See id. at 630-31.
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expectations part of the test. While the majority opinion did not
expressly state this position, 18 five justices indicated that notice
does not preclude a takings claim and can still be considered in
evaluating investment-backed expectations. 19 Since the Penn
Central test is itself quite protective of government regulatory interest, the likelihood of finding a taking will only decrease over
time.
Taken together, these two dimensions of Palazzolo lend substantial support to the validity of most environmental land use
controls. Although knowledge of a restriction can no longer be
used to preclude a takings claim, the Court signaled that the
two-prong regulatory takings test should continue to be applied
in a way generally supportive of government's regulatory efforts. 20 Rightly understood, this test permits substantial regulation of land to further valid public interests, and Palazzolo did little to change that.
This article reviews the state of regulatory takings law after
Palazzolo, with particular attention to controls on environmentally sensitive land. Part II briefly examines regulatory takings
law prior to Palazzolo, first discussing development of the twoprong takings test currently used by the Court and then analyzing how the issue of notice of restrictions had been handled
prior to Palazzolo.21 This analysis shows that although the Supreme Court had earlier intimated that notice should not preclude claims, lower courts typically found, on one of several alternative grounds, that notice did preclude such claims.
Part III then examines Palazzolo itself, focusing primarily on
the central issue of notice. 22 It demonstrates how the Palazzolo
Court rejected a notice preclusion rule, predicated on two rationales: (1) regulations that are takings when enacted cannot
become valid by the mere passage of time; and (2) rejection of a
notice rule was necessary to protect a prior owner's right to
transfer. These rationales suggest the rights of a purchaser of
land taken with notice of a regulation are derived from constitutional claims of predecessors, and must be analyzed from that
perspective. Moreover, a close reading of Palazzolo indicates that
18. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626-30.
19. See id. at 633-635 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 636-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 654 n.3 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
20. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001).
21. See infra Part II.

22. See infra Part III.
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a majority of the Court would still permit notice to be a factor,
though not a dispositive one, in analyzing interference with investment-backed expectations under Penn Central.
Parts IV and V examine the status of regulatory taking
claims after Palazzolo. Part IV discusses the Lucas categorical taking standard in light of Palazzolo.23 Palazzolo affirms the more extreme nature of this type of taking, with the focus on remaining
economic potential rather than on lost development opportunities. 24 Thus, courts should find a taking only in very rare circumstances. This part also demonstrates that concerns voiced
by some that rejection of a notice rule will permit landowners to
"strategically manufacture" Lucas type claims, are unfounded.
The lack of economic viability in such instances would result
from landowner, rather than government action, and would
therefore not qualify as a taking.
Finally, Part V explores the status of Penn Central takings after Palazzolo.25 After briefly discussing the Penn Central standard, the section examines three basic regulatory scenarios reflecting development potential at the time of investment and at
the time of regulation: (1) where there is low development potential both when the property is acquired and regulated; (2)
where there is low development potential when property is acquired, but the development potential of the land, along with its
value, rises significantly prior to regulation; and (3) where
someone purchases property at a price reflecting permitted development opportunities, which is then down-zoned resulting in
substantial economic loss. This article argues that takings under
Penn Central should never occur under the first scenario and
only rarely under the second. Even the third scenario, which
presents the strongest case for a taking under Penn Central, will
usually not rise to the level of an unconstitutional taking. In
such situations the Court has noted that landowners must anticipate newly enacted restrictions that will diminish land values, which necessarily form the reasonableness of any investment-backed expectations landowners have. 26 For that reason,
courts have typically required diminution in value of a property
far exceeding fifty percent, and closer to ninety percent, before

23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra Part IV.
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001).
See infra Part V.
See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
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takings are found.27
II.

REGULATORY TAKINGS PRIOR To PALAZZOLO

Supreme Court Takings Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence has taken a
long, and at times, tortuous path, and still remains far from
clear. 28 The concept of a regulatory taking emerged in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,29 in which the Court struck down a state
statute because it had the effect of requiring coal companies to
keep a portion of coal in the ground to avoid subsidence damage
to surface structures. 30 While recognizing the government could
not function if it had to pay every time its regulations reduced
the value of land, the Court held that a regulation is a taking "if
a regulation goes too far." 31 The Court concluded that the regulation had "gone too far," but offered little explanation other
the mining of anthracite coal
than to state that the statute made
"commercially impracticable." 32 It noted, however, that "at bot33
tom" the issue was where the burden of regulation should lie.
The Court in Pennsylvania Coal recognized the concept of a
regulatory taking, yet provided little guidance to determine
when the economic impact of a regulation constitutes a taking.
Over the years, the Court has struggled considerably in developing a workable standard for regulatory takings cases, with
which, according to academic commentators, it has not been
A.

27. See, e.g., Nasser v. City of Homewood, 671 F.2d 432, 438 (11th Cir. 1982)
(finding that a 53% diminution in value was not a taking); Bernardsville Quarry,

Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377, 1386-90 (N.J. 1992) (finding that a
90% diminution in value was not a taking).
28. Numerous commentators have noted the less than clear state of the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence. See, e.g., ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE
LAW OF PROPERTY 514 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that the lack of clear standards has led
to confusion); Michael Allan Wolf, Taking Regulatory Takings Personally: The Perils of
(Mis)reasoning by Analogy, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1355, 1355 (2000) ("profound puzzle");
Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, 77 CAL. L.

REV. 1301, 1303-04 (1989) ("doctrinal and conceptual disarray"); J. Peter Byrne, Ten
Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L. Q. 89,

102 (1995) ("an unworkable muddle"); Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Takings, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 591, 591-92 (1998) ("The
doctrine remains in perplexing disarray").

29. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
30. Id. at 412-13, 416.
31. Id. at 415.
32. Id. at 414.

33. Id. at 416.
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very successful. 34 The Court itself has at times characterized its
takings jurisprudence as involving ad hoc inquiries. 35 Yet, while
never abandoning the concept of a regulatory taking, the Court
has made clear that most government regulations that impose
economic losses are not takings, even when imposing substantial
economic burdens on landowners. 36 This standard holds true
notwithstanding a number of decisions in recent years that are
37
favorable to property owners.
The Court's current test for regulatory takings based on
economic impact comes from two cases: Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City 38 and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.39 Penn Central involved a challenge to New York City's
Landmark Preservation Law as a taking.40 Through the Landmark Preservation Law, Grand Central Terminal was recognized
as a "landmark," 41 thus requiring the Landmark Preservation
Commission to approve any exterior changes to the building,
even if the changes were consistent with applicable zoning regulations.42 Penn Central, as the owner of Grand Central Terminal,
sought approval of two alternative plans to build either a fiftythree or fifty-five story addition to the building, both of which
met current zoning requirements. 43 The Commission rejected
both plans on the grounds that they would aesthetically deni34. See supra note 28.
35. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
36. The Court has frequently noted the need for and validity of general land
use regulations, even when striking down the particular regulation before it. See,
e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385-86, 396 (1992) (strongly affirming the
validity and necessity of most land use controls). See also, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (recognizing that government could not function if
it had to pay compensation whenever regulations reduced land values).
37. Prior to Palazzolo, the Court held in favor of landowners in a number of recent regulatory takings cases. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). These decisions, although advancing constitutional protection for property rights to some degree, largely concerned more extreme fact patterns, such as the loss of all economic viability in
Lucas, the lack of reasonable exaction practices in Dolan and Nollan, and abusive
procedural practices in Del Monte Dunes.
38. 438 U.S. 104 (1977).
39. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
40. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
41. See id. at 115-16.
42. See id. at 112.
43. See id. at 116-17.
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grate the landmark, 44 in effect eliminating or greatly reducing
the previously existing and quite valuable air rights that Penn
Central had. Penn Central then challenged the application of the
45
law as a taking.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that it had
previously eschewed any "set formula" for determining takings,
46
preferring instead to "engage in essentially ad hoc inquiries."
It then identified three relevant factors used in deciding takings
cases: the character of the government action, the economic impact of the regulation, and most importantly, the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations. 47 On that latter
basis, the Court held that the Landmark Preservation Law did
not constitute a taking as applied to Penn Central's property, because the regulation still permitted a "reasonable return" on the
48
investment of the land.
Particularly significant in determining that the interference
with Penn Central's investment-backed expectations did not
constitute a taking was that the Landmark Law did not prevent
49
Penn Central from using the property for its original purpose.
Grand Central terminal had been used for the previous sixty-five
years as a railroad terminal containing office space and concessions.50 For that reason the Landmark Law did not "interfere
with what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel." 51 Thus, even though the
Landmark Law in effect eliminated more intensive development
opportunities previously permitted by applicable zoning, the assurance of a reasonable return and continuation of previous uses
that formed earlier expectations negated any takings claim.
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,5 2 the plaintiff purchased two undeveloped beachfront lots for $975,000, both of
which were zoned for residential development at the time of acquisition.53 Subsequently a coastal preservation law was passed
that had the effect of prohibiting any development on the prop44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See id. at 116-18.
See id. at 119.
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
See id.
See id. at 136.

49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 121.
See id. at 115-16.
Id. at 136.
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

53. See id. at 1007.
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erty, and Lucas challenged the restriction as a taking5 4 The trial
court found that the restriction rendered the property "valueless" and therefore constituted a taking.55 The South Carolina
Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that even if the regulation
left the property valueless, it was not a taking because of the im56
portant public interests served.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority of the Court, reiterated that the Court had generally avoided any "set formula" in
deciding taking cases, instead preferring to engage in essentially
ad hoc inquiries.57 Nevertheless, he noted that the Court had
previously recognized two types of categorical takings. The first
type involves physical invasions, in which the government invades or grants the right to other parties to physically intrude
upon the property.58 In these situations, a compensable taking is
almost automatically triggered, irrespective of the economic impact caused by the restriction. 59
The second type of categorical taking recognized in Lucas is
"where the regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of the land." 60 In justifying this type of categorical
taking, the Court noted that "in the extraordinary circumstance"
when the land has lost all economic viability, "it is less realistic
to indulge in our usual assumption that the legislature is simply
'adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life.' ' 61 How54. See id. at 1006-09.
55. See id. at 1009.
56. See id. at 1009-10.
57. See id. at 1015 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1977)).
58. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
59. See 505 U.S. at 1015. The Court cited several examples of this type of categorical taking, including Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982) (law requiring landlords to allow cable companies to place cables in
rental properties) and United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (physical invasion of airspace).
60. 505 U.S. at 1015. In recognizing this category of taking, the Court pointed
to a number of cases which in dicta recognized that a taking occurs when a regulation "denies an owner economically viable use of his land." Id. at 1015-16. The
Court used the phrase in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), stating that a
zoning law will be a taking if it "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land." Id.at 260. The
Court used that same articulation of the standard in a series of decisions in the
1980s. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981). In none
of the decisions was there a finding of "no economic viability."
61. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18.
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ever, the Court also stated that the loss of all economic viability
would not constitute a taking where the regulation was part of
the background principles of law, most notably where it is
merely preventing a common law nuisance. 62 In such an instance the prohibited land use is not part of the landowner's
63
property interest to begin with.
In recognizing that the loss of economic viability in the land
at issue constituted a categorical taking, the Court was careful
not to preclude the possibility of finding a taking when a restriction reduces, but does not altogether eliminate economic viability. 64 In a footnote the Court stated that such a restriction might
still constitute a taking under the analysis established in Penn
Central.65 It did not clearly define how such a test might work,
but stated that "the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and.., the extent to which the regulation interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations are keenly rele66
vant" to its general takings analysis.
Thus, in Lucas the Court established what might be viewed
as a two-prong test for analyzing whether the economic impact
of a taking constitutes a taking. 67 First, if the regulation leaves a
property owner with no economic viability, it is a categorical
taking, absent a finding that the prohibited use was precluded
by background principles of law. 68 Second, if some economic viability remains, a court is to analyze the restriction under the
Penn Central factors, with particular attention to the regulation's
economic impact and interference with investment-backed ex69
pectations.
Although the Court had established this general framework
for regulatory takings, it had not clearly addressed how landowner notice of restrictions prior to acquisition of property affected its takings analysis. Lower courts, however, were forced
62. See id. at 1029.
63. See id. at 1029-31.
64. See id. at 1019 n.8.
65. See id.
66. Id. Justice Stevens' dissent criticized the majority for adopting a rule that
provides relief for a total loss of economic viability, but no relief when the diminution in value is 95%. In response, the majority emphasized that the "no economic
viability" standard is a categorical taking, but that even when some economic viability remains a taking still might be found under the Court's balancing test previously established in Penn Central. See id.
67. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.
68. See id. at 1027.
69. See id. at 1019 n.8.
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to address this issue frequently. The next subsection examines
how the notice issue had been addressed prior to Palazzolo.
B.

The Notice Issue Priorto Palazzolo

Despite a significant increase in deciding takings cases over
the past two decades, the Supreme Court itself had only once,
prior to Palazzolo, given brief attention to the notice issue. In that
case, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,70 the Court briefly
discussed the issue in a footnote, essentially giving a preview of
what it would later say in Palazzolo.71 Nollan dealt with the primary issue of whether a taking occurs when approval for development is conditioned on a landowner first providing a physical
dedication of land, where that dedication is unrelated to any
impact resulting from the development. 72 Emphasizing the
Court's longstanding concern for physical invasions of property,
the Court held that such exactions would be valid only if there is
an "essential nexus" between the required dedication and the
asserted state interest that would justify denial of the development in the first instance. 73
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that even if such a rule
were generally adopted, it should not apply to the Nollans because exactions previously had been required of forty-three
other similar properties. 74 These exactions put the Nollans on
notice of the restriction, thereby precluding any taking claim
they might otherwise have. The majority rejected this argument
in a footnote, stating that if the policy when first imposed would
constitute a taking, then "the prior owners must be understood
to have transferred their full property rights in conveying the
lots." 75 This rationale seems inconsistent with a "notice" rule,
indicating that a right to challenge the restriction as a taking attaches to the land and passes to subsequent purchasers.
This aspect of Nollan, although apparently establishing that
notice of a restriction does not preclude a taking, received little
attention from lower courts, especially as it might apply to takings based on economic impact only.76 There are arguably sev-

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

483 U.S. 825 (1987).
See id. at 834 n.2.
See id. at 834.
See id. at 837.
See id. at 857-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 834 n.2.
See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
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eral reasons for this oversight. First, the notice issue was not
central to the Court's analysis in Nollan, which explains why it
was only addressed in a footnote. Second, despite its significance to exactions, Nollan was predicated on physical appropriation of an easement, a highly sensitive area of the law, 77 making
the case's applicability to takings based on economic impact
78
alone uncertain.
For whatever reason, the majority of lower courts both before and after Nollan have held that notice precluded or was a
significant factor in precluding a takings claim, in situations
where the claimant acquired property after a restriction was in
place. 79 In doing so, such courts almost inevitably ignored the
Nollan footnote,80 instead basing their reasoning on one of several grounds. First, courts frequently held that prior notice of a
regulation fatally undermined any investment-backed expectations under Penn Central.81 As these courts found that interfer77. The Court has frequently emphasized that greater scrutiny is required
when the government physically invades or grants permission to others to physically invade private property, since the right to exclude is one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of property rights. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374 (1994); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). The Court in Nollan also emphasized that the exaction involved a physical invasion of private property, noting the
highly sensitive nature of such a requirement. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.
78. See Gregory M. Stein, Who Gets the Takings Claim? Changes in Land Use Law,
Pre-Enactment Owners, and Post-Enactment Buyers, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 124-26 (2000)
(suggesting this distinction limited Nollan's precedential value on the notice issue).
79. See, e.g., Avenel v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 937-38 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Hoeck v. City of Portland, 57 F.3d 781, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1995); Loveladies Harbor,
Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Hunziker v. State, 519
N.W.2d 367, 370-71 (Iowa 1994); Claridge v. N.H. Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287, 291
(N.H. 1984); Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 678 N.E.2d 870, 871-72 (N.Y. 1997);
Wooten v. South Carolina. Coastal Council, 510 S.E.2d 716 (S.C. 1999); Virginia
Beach v. Bell, 498 S.E.2d 414 (Va. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 826 (1998). For an excellent discussion of the notice rule as it has been applied by lower courts, see R. S.
Radford and J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island
Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory Takings
Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 449 (2001); see also Steven J. Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory
Takings Quartet: Retreatingfrom the Rule of Law, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 345 (1998) (indepth discussion of four New York cases, issued at the same time, which applied
the notice rule); see also Stein, supra note 78, at 89 (thorough analysis of various considerations in the notice rule, especially from the seller's perspective).
80. See Radford & Breemer, supra note 79, at 499 (noting that most post-Lucas
cases have ignored the Nollan majority and followed Brennan's dissent).
81. See, e.g., Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Forest
Properties, Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 951 (1999); Golf Club of Plantation v. City of Plantation, 717 So. 2d 166, 170
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Claridge v. N.H. Wetlands Bd., A.2d 287, 291 (N.H. 1984);
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ence with investment-backed expectations was an important
dimension of takings law, they reasoned that knowledge of a re82
striction necessarily limited any expectation that might exist.
In other words, the owner's expectations were necessarily informed by the existence of the restriction when the property was
acquired.
For example, in Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Board,
the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld wetlands restrictions by emphasizing that the restrictions were in place prior to
purchase and therefore the landowner had notice. 83 Stating that
the extent of interference with investment-backed expectations is
particularly relevant in takings analysis, the Court stated that
"[a] person who purchases land with notice of statutory impediments to the right to develop that land can justify few, if
any, legitimate investment-backed expectations of development
rights which rise to the level of constitutionally protected prop84
erty rights."
Second, prior to Palazzolo some lower courts held that restrictions on property existing at the time of purchase constituted "background principles of law" under Lucas, and therefore
a landowner's "bundle of rights" was necessarily limited by
such restrictions.8 5 For example, in Hunziker v. State,8 6 the Iowa
Karam v. N.J. Dep't Envtl Prot., 705 A.2d 1221, 1228-29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div
1998); Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 678 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1997), cert. denied, 521
U.S. 1132 (1997); McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 530 S.E.2d 28, 633-36
(S.C. 2000).
82. See supra note 81.
83. 485 A.2d 287 (N.H. 1984).
84. Id. at 291. A number of cases from the federal circuit court of appeals have
similarly emphasized notice as undermining investment-backed expectation, blending it with the Lucas analysis. This was first stated in Loveladies Harbor,Inc. v. United
States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994), in which the court stated the post-Lucas
state of takings law as requiring a showing of both a denial of economic viability
and an interference with investment-backed expectations. Although Loveladies itself
found a taking where there was a 99% diminution in value and no notice, subsequent federal circuit court decisions applied this standard so as to preclude, or at
least limit, takings claims when a landowner acquired property with notice of the
restrictions, reasoning that there were no reasonable investment-backed expectations in such situations. See Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
1999); Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 951 (1999); Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
85. See, e.g., Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Iowa 1994); Gazza v. New
York Dep't of Envtl Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 1997); Wooten v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 510 S.E.2d 716, 717-18 (S.C. 1999); City of Virginia Beach
v. Bell, 498 S.E.2d 414, 417-18 (Va. 1998).
86. Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367 (Iowa 1994).
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Supreme Court rejected a takings claim to a state statute that had
the effect of prohibiting any development on plaintiff's land af87
ter a Native-American burial mound was discovered there.
The court rejected a takings claim under Lucas, saying that irrespective of the law's economic impact, the statute was in effect
prior to the claimant's purchase of the property. 88 As such, the
statute became part of Iowa's property law prior to the claimant's purchase of the property, and thus the "bundle of rights"
acquired did not include the right to continue development of
the land once the burial mound was discovered. 89
Although the majority of lower courts prior to Palazzolo
adopted one of the above rationales to preclude takings claims
when there was landowner notice, a few of them rejected a per
se notice rule, reasoning that takings claims survived transfer of
title. 90 In doing so at least one court cited Nollan as rejecting a
notice rule and making irrelevant restrictions on property predating a claimants acquisition in takings claims. 91 More fundamentally, several decisions reasoned that a notice rule would
92
undermine the ability to freely transfer property.
In the most significant of these decisions, Palm Beach Isles
Associates v. United States,93 decided less than a year before Palazzolo, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit appeared to
modify its previous position 94 and held that notice does not preclude a takings claim under Lucas. 95 In response to a petition for
rehearing, which the court denied, it then issued a second opinion analyzing in-depth the role of notice in the takings doctrine. 96 It affirmed its earlier statement, stating that although notice remains relevant as a factor in analyzing investment-backed
expectations under Penn Central, it is not relevant in evaluating
whether there is a categorical taking under Lucas.97 Although
87. See id. at 368-70.

88. See id. at 371.
89. See id. at 370-71.
90. See, e.g., Store Safe Redlands Assoc. v. United States, 35 Fed. C1. 726, 735
(1996); Vatalaro v. Dep't of Envtl Regulation, 601 So. 2d 1223, 1229 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992); Lopes v. City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312, 1315 (Mass. 1994).
91. See, e.g., Store Safe Redlands Assoc., 35 Fed. Cl. at 735.
92. See id.; Lopes, 629 N.E.2d at 1314-15.
93. 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000), rehearing en banc denied, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
94. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
95. See 231 F.3d at 1358-61.
96. See id. at 1354.
97. See id. at 1363-64. The court justified this distinction by noting that in the
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this holding appears contrary to other Federal Circuit cases, the
Palm Beach Isles court distinguished the relevant statements in
those cases as dicta instead of central holdings of the cases. 98
Palm Beach Isles, issued just several months before the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Palazzolo, was in some
ways a precursor to Palazzolo, anticipating the general direction
the Supreme Court was to take. At the time, however, it represented a distinct minority position among lower courts on the
notice issue, with the majority of courts holding that notice of restrictions in effect precludes takings claims. 99 The next part discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
with special attention to the Court's rejection of the notice rule.
III. PALAZZOLO V. RHODE ISLAND] 00
A.

Facts and Background

In 1959, Anthony Palazzolo formed a small corporation,
SGI, for the sole purpose of acquiring three undeveloped and
contiguous parcels of land on the Rhode Island coast.10 1 The
property in question consisted of eighteen acres of coastal wetlands and several adjoining uplands acres. 10 2 Any development
of the wetlands portion required substantial fill before any
building could occur, which in turn required a dredge and fill
permit from the state. 103 Palazzolo became the sole shareholder
of the corporation shortly after the purchase, and three times between 1962 and 1966 applied to the state for permission to fill
the land. 04 His first application was turned down because it
lacked essential information. 105 The second and third applications were referred to the Rhode Island Department of Natural
typical case in which land is acquired subject to restrictions, the purchaser does not
have reasonable expectations that the property cannot be used in a prohibited manner; thus, to find a taking "is to give the purchaser a windfall to which she is not
entitled." Id. at 1363. However, loss of all economic viability is equivalent to a
physical invasion and notice should not be relevant. Further, a purchaser can reasonably assume that property can be used for some lawful purpose, which is interfered with when there is a loss of all economic viability. See id. at 1363.
98. See id. at 1358-61.
99. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.

100. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See id. at 613.
See id.
See id. at 613-14.
See id. at 613.
See id. at 614.
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Resources, which ultimately disapproved the fill applications
10 6
because of adverse environmental impacts.
SGI and Palazzolo made no further attempts to get permission to fill the wetlands for more than fifteen years. 107 In the
meantime, however, several significant events occurred. First, in
1971, Rhode Island created the Coastal Resources Management
Council, which was given authority to regulate coastal wetlands. 108 In 1977, the Council enacted regulations which, in effect, prohibited any development on the property without prior
approval of the Council. 109 Second, in 1978 the state revoked
SGI's corporate charter for failure to pay taxes. 110 As a result, the
property passed to Palazzolo as the corporation's sole shareholder, who thereafter owned the property personally."'
Palazzolo made new applications in 1983 and 1985 to fill
and develop the property.1 2 The 1983 application, which requested permission to fill all eighteen acres of wetlands, was rejected on several grounds, including vagueness and its potential
impact on surrounding wetlands. 1 3 The 1985 application was
less ambitious, seeking to fill and develop eleven acres for use as
a beach club.114 The Council again rejected the application, stating that the proposal conflicted with the standards for a special
exception as required under the Council's regulations." 5 The
Council noted that granting a special exception for the proposed
development required a "compelling public purpose," which the
116
beach club proposal had not established.
Palazzolo then initiated a takings claim in state court, arguing that the wetlands regulations as applied to his property constituted a taking under the federal Constitution.117 The com-

106. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 613-14.
107. See id. at 614.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 614-15.
113. See id. at 614. The 1983 application sought permission to build a bulkhead
and fill the entire wetlands. The Council said the application "was 'vague and inadequate for a project of its size and nature."' Id. It also said the project would
have a significant effect on the waters and wetlands of Winnapaug Pond nearby
and conflict with the Coastal Resources Management Plan in effect. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
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plaint alleged a loss of all economic viability under the standard
established in Lucas, and sought damages in the amount of
$3,150,000, which Palazzolo claimed was the lost profit from not
being able to develop seventy-four residential lots. 118
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial court
holding that there was no taking on three grounds: (1) the takings claim was not ripe; (2) any takings claim that might exist
was precluded by Palazzolo's notice of the restriction when he
acquired the property in 1978; and (3) the property was still economically viable, because the uplands portion was worth
$200,000 for development and the wetlands retained $153,000
value as a conservation gift.119
B.

Holding and Analysis
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's holding on the first two points above, finding
that the case was ripe for review and that notice of the regulation did not preclude a takings claim under either the Lucas or
Penn Central standards. 120 However, it agreed that under the
facts, Palazzolo had not been denied all economically viable use
of the land, since he would still be allowed to put a residence on
the uplands portion of the property. 2 1 The Court therefore remanded the case back to the lower court to determine if the
state's action constituted a taking under Penn Central. 22
The Court began its analysis by affirming the two-part test
for regulatory takings established earlier in Lucas and Penn Central, stating that subject to certain qualifications a regulation that
denies an owner "all economically beneficial or productive use
of land" will be a categorical taking under Lucas.1 23 It affirmed,
however, that a regulation that falls short of eliminating all economic viability might still be a taking under Penn Central, and
thus must be separately analyzed under what it labeled the
"complex of factors" from that decision. 124 These factors include
118. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 614.
119. See Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 712-16 (R.I. 2000).
120. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630-31.
121. See id. at 631.
122. See id. at 615, 624.
123. See id. at 615. The qualifications alluded to by the Court concerned the observation in Lucas that a landowner cannot recover for a loss of all economic viability where the restriction constitutes a "background principle" of law. See id. at 62223, citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
124. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18.
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"the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to
which the regulation interferes with reasonable investmentbacked expectations, and the character of the government action." 125 Importantly, the Court stated that this analysis is to be
"informed by the purpose of the Takings Clause," which "is to
prevent the government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
126
by the public as a whole."
The Court then proceeded to discuss each of the grounds relied on by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, beginning with and
giving the most attention to the ripeness issue. 127 Here the Court
stated that the central inquiry under its precedents was whether
Palazzolo had "obtained a final decision from the Council determining the permitted use of the land." 128 The Court stated
Palazzolo had, based upon what it called "the unequivocal nature of the wetlands regulations at issue." 129 The relevant state
regulations prohibited any fill or development next to a "Type
2" body of water, which a pond adjacent to Palazzolo's land
happened to be, without a "special exception" from the Council. 130 "Special exceptions" could be granted only where a
"compelling public purpose" was established, and the state
Coastal Management Resources Council specifically held that
1 31
Palazzolo's proposal did not constitute a compelling interest.
Therefore, as reviewed by the Court, the Council had essentially interpreted its regulations and applied them to Palazzolo's
property so as to eliminate the possibility of any development of
the wetlands. As seen by the Court, even a proposal to fill a
smaller area would be rejected, since it would still not meet the
"compelling public purpose" standard required for special exceptions. 132 On that basis the Court distinguished the case from
those in which denial of one substantial project still left the state

125. Id. at 617.

126. Id. at 617-18 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
The Court first stated this "fairness and justice" purpose for the takings clause in
Armstrong, and has restated it in numerous subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong); Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1977) (quoting Armstrong).

127. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 618.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id. at 619.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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with the discretion to allow a more modest project. 133 By contrast, application of the regulations here indicated there was no
discretion to approve any project on the wetlands, leaving only
$200,000 development value on the uplands property.1 34 As
such, the case was sufficiently ripe for review. 135
The Court next turned its attention to the central issue in the
case, which was whether notice of a regulation when property is
acquired precludes a takings claim. 36 The Court held it did not,
133. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 619-21. The Court noted earlier cases indicating
that "a landowner may not establish a taking before a land-use authority has the
opportunity, using its own reasonable procedures, to decide and explain the reach
of a challenged regulation." Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 620. This requires that government be able to first exercise variances and other discretionary devices. Moreover,
rejection of one development proposal does not meet the finality requirement if the
state could exercise its discretion to grant permission for a more modest proposal.
This stands for the fundamental principle that a court cannot determine whether a
taking has occurred until it knows the "extent of permitted development" on the
land. On that basis, the Court in a series of cases held that the takings issue was not
ripe. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (deciding that a denial of a 476-unit subdivision
proposal was not a taking because claimant did not seek variances that might have
permitted development and did not seek compensation through state procedures);
McDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (finding that a
denial of 159 home residential subdivisions was not a taking because there was still
the possibility that a less ambitious proposal would be approved); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1986) (finding that the situation in question was not ripe for a
taking analysis because no development plans were submitted). See also Suitum v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 736, 738 (1997) (finding it difficult to
establish a taking by mere enactment of regulations since land use officials typically
have substantial discretion to soften regulations). But see Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (holding that a state cannot use repetitive and unfair procedures and denials to avoid final decision).
134. The Court noted that Palazzolo had not submitted an application to develop the uplands property, but said that was not problematic. It stated that the
purpose of submitting applications is to determine how far regulatory restrictions
extend, and therefore the obligation to explore development opportunities is necessary "only if there is uncertainty as to the land's permitted use." Palazzolo, 533 U.S.
at 622. The state had previously agreed that the uplands property had an estimated
worth of $200,000, which the Court said was well-founded in the trial court record,
and therefore rejected ripeness arguments by the state based on lack of development applications for the uplands property. See id. at 621-23.
135. The Court also rejected the state's argument that the takings claim was not
ripe because Palazzolo had never submitted a development proposal for a seventyfour lot subdivision, which was the basis for the damages sought. The state argued
that at a minimum prior approval for such an extensive development was necessary
from local zoning authorities before a takings claim could be brought against the
Council for a taking based on a seventy-four lot subdivision. The Court said the
level of development that other regulations would permit would be relevant in assessing the amount of damages, but was irrelevant in determining whether a taking
occurred. See id. at 623-25.
136. See id. at 626-27.
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reversing the Rhode Island Supreme Court and rejecting the position taken by a majority of lower courts.137 In doing so, the
Court stated that notice neither constituted a background principle under Lucas nor involved a negation of investment-backed
expectations under Penn Central so as to preclude a takings
138
claim.
The Court relied on two principal rationales for rejecting the
position that notice bars a taking.139 First, the Court rejected the
argument that by prospective legislation the state can shape and
define the extent of property rights, in essence the argument that
such restrictions become background principles of law under
Lucas.140 The Court stated that "[t]he State may not put so potent
a Hobbesian stick in the Lockean bundle." 141 Although it acknowledged that the state may put reasonable restrictions on
land uses, including prospective enactments that diminish land
value, restrictions that are unreasonable when imposed do not
become less reasonable over time.142 Otherwise the state could
in effect put an expiration date on takings, no matter how unrea143
sonable.
Second, and perhaps even more fundamental, the Court
emphasized that rejection of the notice rule was necessary to
protect owners at the time a restriction was imposed; otherwise,
they would essentially lose their right to sell the property for
any reasonable value.'4 According to the Court, this would be
"a critical alteration of the nature of property," since it would effectively deprive the owner of the right to transfer the property. 145 Thus, rejection of the notice rule is necessary not so
much to protect the interests of the current owner, as to secure
full protection for the rights of the owner when the restriction
46
was imposed.
The Court also noted that it previously rejected the notice
rule in Nollan, which established that takings claims passed with
137. See id. at 628.

138.
139.
140.
141.

See id. at 627, 630.
See id. at 627-28.
See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
See id. at 627.

142. See id. at 625-27.

143. See id. at 627.
144. See id.
145. See id.

146. Indeed, this seems to have been the primary focus of the Court's rejection of
the notice rule in Nollan. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834
n.2 (1987).
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the transfer of title. 147 It rejected the state's argument that Lucas
limited Nollan by making newly enacted restrictions background
principles of law that cannot be challenged by subsequent purchasers. 148 The Court stated that "a regulation that otherwise
would be unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a background principle of law by mere virtue of the
passage of title." 149 To hold otherwise would make regulations
background principles for some landowners and not for others,
rather than basing the standard on "common, shared understandings of permissible limitations derived from a state's legal
50
tradition," as contemplated by Lucas.
Finally, after rejecting the notice rule, the Court briefly considered whether Palazzolo had shown a denial of all economic
viability to establish a taking under Lucas.151 On this point, the
Court agreed with the Rhode Island Supreme Court, finding that
under the facts as presented, Palazzolo's property still retained
economic viability and, therefore, the regulation was not a categorical taking under Lucas.152 The Court noted that the parcel
still retained $200,000 in development value and permitted the
building of a "substantial residence" on the property.' 53 The
Court acknowledged that the state could not avoid a Lucas type
taking by leaving only a token interest, but stated that it was certainly not a token interest where the state permitted the building
of a residence. 54 The Court remanded the case, however, for determination of whether a taking might still be found under the
Penn Central standard, which was not considered by the court
55
below.
Justices O'Connor and Scalia wrote concurring opinions,
56
while Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented.
Most critical in this regard was O'Connor's concurrence, which
provided an important qualification to the majority's rejection of
the notice rule. 5 7 Although O'Connor joined in the majority

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627-29.
See id. at 629-30.
Id. at 629-30.
Id. at 630.
See id. at 630-31.
See id. at 630-32.
See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631.
See id.
See id. at 632.
See id. at 632-55.
See id. at 632-36.
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opinion, she stated that notice of a restriction can continue to
play a role in assessing the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations under Penn Central. 58 To O'Connor,
it would be equally wrong to either make notice dispositive, as
the Rhode Island Supreme Court did, or to ignore it altogether. 5 9 Rather, she interpreted the majority opinion as simply
"restor[ing] balance" to the inquiry regarding investmentbacked expectations, in which notice of restrictions, although no
160
longer dispositive, remains a relevant factor.
Justice Scalia's concurrence rejected this reading of the majority opinion, stating instead that notice should be irrelevant in
the takings analysis, including consideration of investmentbacked expectations under Penn Central.161 However, a close
reading of the dissenting opinions shows that all four dissenting
justices agreed with O'Connor, stating that at a minimum, notice
should be relevant under Penn Central.162 Justice Stevens, while
concurring in the majority's ripeness analysis, dissented from
the judgment, and in particular from the Court's rejection of the
notice rule. 1 63 Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Souter and
Breyer, dissented on ripeness grounds, 64 but in a footnote at the
end stated that if the claim were ripe, she would "at a minimum
agree with Justice O'Connor... that transfer of title can impair a
takings claim." 165 Justice Breyer also wrote a short, separate dissent expressing his agreement with Justice O'Connor on the
principle that notice should neither preclude a claim on the one
166
hand, nor be altogether irrelevant on the other.
Thus, five justices are on record as indicating that, "at a
minimum," notice can continue to play some role in assessing

158. See id. at 632-36.
159. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633.
160. See id. at 635.
161. See id. at 637-38.
162. See infra notes 163-66.
163. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 63445.
164. See id. at 645-55. Justice Ginsburg primarily argued that the takings claim
was not yet ripe because Palazzolo had never submitted a plan to develop the uplands portion of the property, thus making it uncertain how much development
might be permitted. See id. at 645-54. She disagreed with the majority's position
that the uplands property was determined to have $200,000 development value,
saying that the record was ambiguous and that the state conceded that value
amount only for purposes of a Lucas type of taking. See id. at 651-54.
165. Id. at 654 n.3.
166. See Palazzolo 533 U.S. at 654.
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takings claims under Penn Central. 67 As a practical matter,
therefore, the effect of Palazzolo on the critical issue of landowner
notice is as follows. Notice is irrelevant for categorical takings
claims under Lucas; once a denial of economic viability is established, it does not matter whether the landowner knew of the restrictions or not. Notice also does not preclude a taking under
the Penn Central test, but it remains relevant, as one factor, in
analyzing the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations. 168 The Court was not clear just how notice should
factor into the analysis, although common sense indicates that it
would diminish investment-backed expectations, and thus to
some degree, make the finding of a taking less likely.
The Court's decision in Palazzolo therefore represents a substantial, though perhaps not complete, renunciation of the notice
rule. It clearly overturned the position taken by most lower
courts, which treated notice as dispositive, but it reinforced notice as a relevant factor under Penn Central.
IV. THE LUCAS STANDARD AFTER PALAZZOLO
As noted above, the Court in Palazzolo affirmed the basic
two-prong test for regulatory takings established in Lucas and
Penn Central.169 This test provides that if a regulation denies a
landowner all economic viability, it is a categorical taking under
Lucas.' 70 If some economic viability remains, the regulation
might still constitute a taking under the Penn Central balancing
test, in which a court considers the economic impact of the regulation, the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. 17'
The Court's elucidation of the Lucas standard itself was
rather modest in Palazzolo. For the most part the standard remains "ambiguous" at best, with a number of questions never
answered by the Court. 172 In particular, commentators have
noted that any analysis of economic viability must first be based
167. See Echeverria, supra note 4, at 11113-14 (stating that O'Connor's concurring
opinion, together with dissenting opinions, represents the Court's treatment of the
notice issue).
168. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632-36.
169. See id. at 630-33.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 633.
172. See Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and
Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REV. 91, 120-27 (1995) (discussing various ambiguities in the economically viable use standard).
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on some relevant "base price," but the Court's opinions have
173 To the exgiven no guidance on how that price is determined.
tent the Court in Lucas gave any signals, it was that loss of economic viability would typically occur where property had to be
174
left in its natural state, precluding development altogether.
For the most part Palazzolo did not clarify the uncertainty
regarding how the "economically viable" test is to be applied. It
did, however, affirm several broad characterizations about the
test. Perhaps most significant, the Court affirmed what it had
suggested in Lucas: categorical takings based on denial of economic viability are limited to highly unusual and extreme facts,
and cannot be based on mere diminution in value, no matter
how substantial. 75 Palazzolo had tried to make the case for a
"total taking" by comparing the profit potential of the property,
$3,150,000, with the minimum residual value, $200,000.176 He
argued that in that context the state "cannot sidestep" Lucas "'by
' 177 The
the simple expedient of leaving a few crumbs of value."
Court rejected that comparison, however, focusing on what was
left rather than on what was taken. 178 It acknowledged that the
state cannot escape a categorical taking under Lucas by leaving
just a "token interest" in the property, but said "a regulation
permitting a landowner to build a substantial residence on an
18-acre parcel does not leave the property 'economically
79
idle."1
Not too much should be made of this admittedly cursory
treatment of the "economic viability" standard in Palazzolo. Yet,
if nothing else, it affirms several important points. First, the
standard is limited to extreme situations, not simply where there
has been a significant economic impact. Second, the focus is not
so much on what has been taken, but on what remains. Thus,
the loss of significant profit potential is irrelevant; rather, the focus under Lucas is on what can still be done with the property.
Third, "token interests" do not qualify as economic viability,
173. See id. at 121; Mark Tunick, ConstitutionalProtections of Private Property: Decoupling the Takings and Due ProcessClauses, 3 U. PA. J.CONST. L. 885, 901 (2001).
174. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992)
(finding that a loss of all economically beneficial or productive uses "typically" occurs when land must "be left substantially in its natural state").
175. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630-32.
176. See id. at 630-31.
177. Id. at 640.
178. See id. at 631.
179. Id.
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thus indicating that retention of some de minimus value alone
does not insulate a restriction from being a categorical taking.
This analysis is consistent with Lucas, where the Court characterized loss of all economic viability as an "extraordinary circumstance" that would typically occur when land is "left substantially in its natural state."1 8 0 The Court's sole focus in its
discussion in Lucas was on the absence of any beneficial, economic, or productive uses, in several instances italicizing words
to make its point.1 81 There was no suggestion in Lucas that severe economic impact itself could create a categorical taking.
Indeed, the Court indicated in a footnote that even a 95% loss in
property value would not constitute a denial of all economic or
productive use, noting that this percentage might, although not
necessarily constitute a taking under Penn Central.18 2 Thus, the
gist of Lucas was that categorical takings are based on a complete
absence of productive uses remaining, which will only occur in
highly unusual circumstances.
This understanding of Lucas has also generally been followed by lower courts, which have typically rejected Lucas-type
categorical takings whenever at least some minimal economic
viability remains.18 3 Some courts have gone so far as to suggest
180. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992).
181. See id. at 1017 ("[slurely, at least, in the extraordinary circumstance when no
productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted"); id. at ("[t]here are
good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses").
182. See id. at 1019 n.8. In this footnote the Court responded to an argument in
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion, in which he criticized the majority rule as
"wholly arbitrary" because a "landowner whose property is diminished in value
95% recovers nothing," while the landowner who suffers a complete elimination of
value "recovers the land's full value." Id. at 1064. The majority appeared to agree
that a 95% diminution in value would not constitute a categorical taking, but was
quick to note that a taking might still be found under Penn Central. It further noted,
however, that "at least in some cases" even a 95% diminution in value will not be a
taking. Id. The footnote makes clear that a 95% loss is not a categorical taking because it is not, in the Court's own words, "a complete elimination in value." Id.
183. See, e.g., McAssociates v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 773 A.2d 439, 443-44 (Me.
2001) (finding that in order to establish a Lucas categorical taking, one must
show
that the property is "substantially useless and stripped.., of all practical value"); K
& K Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Nat'l Resources, 575 N.W.2d 531, 539 n.13 (1998) (stating that there is no categorical taking, thus under Lucas it must deny all or substantially all practical uses of the property). See also Glen P. Sugameli, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council: The Categorical and Other "Exceptions" to Liability for Fifth
Amendment Takings of Private Property Far Outweigh the Rule, 29 ENVTL. L. 939, 948-53
(1999) ("[m]any courts have applied Lucas to deny compensation for anything less
than a total (or virtually total) elimination of value and use"); Ronald H. Rosenberg,
The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme Court Regulatory Takings Cases on the State
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that the only basis for finding a taking is loss of all economic viability, a position inconsistent with Lucas and Palazzolo.8 4 All
lower courts have consistently followed the Lucas lead and limited categorical takings to extreme instances. 185 Importantly, severe economic impact has never been a basis for finding a loss of
186
all economic viability.
None of this, of course, gets environmental land use regulations off the Lucas hook. Although Lucas "total takings" are limited to extreme situations, the one instance in which they might
conceivably arise is where the totality of one's property is required to be left in its natural or near-natural state.187 Few land
use controls go that far, but those that might are controls designed to protect environmentally sensitive lands, such as wetlands, farmiand, coastal zones, habitats for endangered species,
and open space. Protection of such land often precludes development, and if the totality of a parcel is so limited, 88 this raises
Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 523, 546-48
(1995) (surveying state courts after Lucas and concluding that "they rarely find" the
no economic viability condition to be met).
184. Such decisions have stated or suggested that a taking required loss of all
economic viability, thus ignoring the possibility of a taking under Penn Central
when some economic viability remains. See, e.g., Tex. Manufactured Housing Ass'n
v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1105 (5th Cir. 1996); Burnham v. Monroe
County, 738 So. 2d 471, 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); JWL Investors, Inc. v. Guilford
County Bd. of Adjustments, 515 S.E.2d 715, 719 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999). See also John
D. Echeverria, Is the Penn Central Three-Factor Test Ready for History's Dustbin?, 53
LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 10 (Jan. 2000) (stating that most lower courts, with exception of the federal circuit and court of federal claims, require total economic loss
for a taking).
185. See supra note 184.
186. Lucas itself makes this clear when it states that even a 95% diminution in
value would not constitute a loss of all economic viability so as to constitute a categorical taking. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.
187. See id. at 1018-19.
188. This raises the issue of what is the relevant property for analysis when
some, but not all of a parcel is restricted. Frequently referred to as the "denominator" issue because it concerns what the relevant denominator is for assessing a
regulation's economic impact, courts and commentators have often noted that how
the relevant parcel is defined for purposes of analysis can greatly affect the degree
of economic impact. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The End of Environmental Law?
Libertarian Property, Natural Law, and the Just Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25 ENVTL. L. 171, 184 (1995); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165, 1192 (1967). Although the Supreme Court in a footnote in Lucas suggested
there are still questions regarding how property is to be defined, see Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1016-17 n.7, the Court in other contexts has made clear that the relevant parcel is
the parcel as a whole and not just the segment being regulated. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497-99; Penn Central Transp. Co.
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the specter of "no economic viability." Moreover, the Court in
Palazzolo indicated that "token interests" do not qualify as economic viability, 189 suggesting that just because de minimus value
is retained, which is almost always the case, a Lucas-type taking
might still exist.
For this reason the basic Lucas standard retains some viability, especially as it concerns environmentally sensitive lands.
Yet, as a general matter it is clear that categorical takings under
Lucas will be very rare - a point made clear in Lucas itself and
consistently affirmed by lower courts. 190 Therefore, Palazzolo did
not change the Lucas standard, but highlighted its very limited
application.
The second, and more certain impact of Palazzolo on the
"economic viability" standard, is its rejection of the notice rule.
The case firmly holds that in those rare instances in which a
regulation eliminates all economic viability, notice of the regulation when the property is acquired does not preclude a takings
claim.191 As a practical matter, if government regulations deprive the property of all economic viability, notice is irrelevant
and apparently not a factor in the analysis. This is in contrast to
the continued relevancy of notice under Penn Central, which Palazzolo indicates can still be considered under the "expectations"
prong of the analysis. 192 There is no comparable "expectations"
factor under Lucas, however, that would even make notice relevant. 193 Thus, once a loss of all economic viability is established,
it makes no difference that the regulation was in place when the
property was acquired.
There is no doubt that this aspect of Palazzolo poses a modest setback to environmental land use controls. Indeed, this is
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1977). See infra note 205 for further discussion of this issue.
189. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616.
190. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18. See also Multi-channel T.V. & Cable Co. v.
Charlottesville Quality Cable Corp., 65 F.3d 1113, 1123 (4th Cir. 1995); Parkridge
Investors Ltd. Partnership by Mortimer v. Farmers Home Admin., 17 F.3d 1192,
1199 (8th Cir. 1994); Marquez v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 140 F. Supp. 2d. 135,
138 (D.P. R. 2001).
191. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627-30.
192. See id. at 626-28.
193. Unlike Penn Central, which invites inquiry into a landowners "investmentbacked expectations," Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, the Lucas standard only concerns what productive uses, if any, are left with the property. Thus, once the notice
rule is rejected, there is no room under the Lucas standard for a landowner's knowledge of a restriction to be relevant. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1071.
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the one instance in which Palazzolo might truly have some impact. Although regulations will rarely result in a loss of all economic viability, to the extent they do occur, such regulations will
usually be environmental land use controls. Prior to Palazzolo
there was the possibility that, as time passed and property
changed hands, the notice rule would gradually eliminate what
would otherwise be takings under the "no economic viability"
rule. 194 This would be particularly true of wetlands regulations,
which began to emerge with force in the 1970s and in very lim195
ited settings, might be a categorical taking under Lucas.
Palazzolo eliminated the possibility that the mere passage of
time and title would gradually eliminate categorical takings,
making clear that claims "attach to and run with the land," in
the words of Nollan196 This possibility presents some vexing issues, especially with regard to a long-term analysis. 197 Yet, at
least as to the relative short-term, the mere passage of title, with
its attendant notice to the purchaser, will not eliminate a prior
takings claim. As such, Palazzolo increases the potential vulnerability of environmental land use regulations in a way that did
not previously exist.
However, in recognizing that Palazzolo expands takings
vulnerability where it might have previously been limited by the
notice rule, it is important to emphasize that Palazzolo does not
empower the seller of property to, in effect, create takings where
none previously existed. What Palazzolo holds is that if a regulation, when enacted, results in a taking, then a subsequent transfer of the property to a purchaser with notice of the regulation
does not change that. 198 In other words, the proper focus for
analysis is the state of conditions at the time the regulation is en194. See supra note 184.
195. The Federal Clean Water Act, which requires that landowners get a permit
before filling and developing wetlands, was passed by Congress in 1972 and is the
basis for federal restrictions on the use and development of wetlands. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344 (1972).
196. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987).
197. If the passage of "time and title" does not eliminate takings claims, then the
state of property interests arguably become locked into a particular time. Although
perhaps in the short-term this makes some sense, it presents the problem that understandings of private and public rights become frozen in time. Scholars have frequently noted that the relative balance of private and public interests in land
changes over time, responding to emerging societal interests. See, e.g., Carol M.
Rose, A Dozen Propositionson Private Property, Public Rights and the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 281 (1996).
198. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626-32.
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acted, and not those subsequently created by action of the parties. For that reason the concerns voiced by some that rejecting a
notice rule "could allow property owners to manufacture such
claims by strategically transferring property until only a nonuseable portion remains" are misplaced.1 99
This can be illustrated by a simple example, similar to the
facts of Palazzolo. Assume that a wetlands regulation is enacted
and applied to a twenty-acre parcel of land, with the effect that
development is prohibited on almost all of the parcel, but a substantial residence is permitted on one acre that can be developed. According to Palazzolo, this is not a categorical taking under Lucas, since the regulation permits some economic
viability. 200 If the owner were then to sell the unusable portion
of the land to a purchaser with notice of the restriction, there
would still be no taking, even if the acquired property had no
economic viability. The reason is simple: unlike Lucas, in this instance the lack of economic viability is due not to the restriction,
which when enacted, permitted economic viability, but rather
results from the actions of the property owner, who sold the
property in such a manner as to create the lack of economic viability.
Any reasonable interpretation of Lucas and Palazzolo suggests that there is no taking in the above scenario, even if the
purchaser's land lacks all economic viability. The Court has
never indicated that property owners themselves can create takings where none previously existed, and indeed, has suggested
they cannot. In particular, the Court has been consistently resistant to attempts to segment property interests when analyzing
takings claims. 201 For example, in Penn Central the Court refused
to treat the air rights above the terminal as separate from the
underlying estate, stating that "[tiakings jurisprudence does not
divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated." 202 The Court in Keystone Bituminous Association v. DeBenedictis2 3 similarly rejected an attempt to treat only

199. Id. at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that several amici had warned that
rejection of a notice rule would permit landowners to manufacture takings claims
by strategic transfers of "property until only a nonuseable portion remains").
200. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 202-04.
202. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1977).
203. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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the regulated portion of property as relevant for takings analy20 4
sis, stating that the property as a whole must be considered.
The Court's refusal to segment property for purposes of takings analysis in these cases is understandable. 20 5 To permit seg204. In Keystone, the Court reviewed a statute, similar to that in Pennsylvania
Coal, which required that coal be kept in the ground to avoid subsidence problems.
Although the regulated coal companies attempted to segment the property by defining the relevant unit of property as only that coal subjection to regulation, the
Court construed the relevant unit of property as including coal that could be mined.
In doing so, it again emphasized that property is not to be segmented for purposes
of takings analysis, but instead treated as a whole. See id. at 497-99.
205. The question of whether to segment property for takings analysis is often
referred to as conceptual severance or the denominator issue. See, e.g., ROBERT
ELLICKSON & VICKI BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 215-16 (Aspen Law & Business 2d
ed. 2001); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in
the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676 (1988); Michelman, supra
note 188, at 1192. The issue is an important one, since if property is segmented for
purposes of a takings analysis, almost every land use restriction might be potentially considered a taking. For this reason the issue has generated a significant
amount of academic commentary in recent years. See, e.g., John E. Fee, Unearthing
the Denominator in Regulatory Takings Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535 (1994); Note,
Federal Circuit's Holding Introduces Subjective Factors into Takings Clause "Denominator" Analysis, 114 HARV. L. REV. 926 (2001); Laura M. Schleich, Takings: The
Fifth Amendment, Government Regulation, and the Problem of the Relevant Parcel, 8 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 381 (1993).
Dicta in Palazzolo suggested that the issue of how to define the relevant parcel, remains a "difficult, persistent question." See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 631, (2001), citing to a footnote in Lucas where the Court suggested the issue
was unresolved. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 101617 n.7 (1992). As a practical matter, however, the Court has consistently rejected
attempts to segment property for purposes of analyzing economic impact. In addition to Penn Central and Keystone, both of which clearly rejected segmenting property for takings analysis, the Court in Concrete Pipe & Products v. Constr. Laborers
Pension Trust of Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993), stated that property was to
be viewed as a whole and not broken into discrete segments. For a discussion of
the Court's rejection of segmentation, see Michael C. Blumm, The End of Environmental Law? Libertarian Property, Natural Law, and the Just Compensation Clause in the
Federal Circuit,25 ENVTL. L. 171, 184-85 (1995).
Lower courts have generally also refused to segment property for takings
analyses. Although the Federal Circuit appeared to segment property in two early
decisions, see Loveladies Harbor, Inc., v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir.
1994); FloridaRock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), in other cases,
including more recent ones, the Circuit has rejected segmentation. See Forest Properties, Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Tabb Lakes, Ltd.
v. Untied States, 10 F.3d 796, 802 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Other cases have also consistently
rejected segmentation. See, e.g., Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 258-61
(2001); Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1577 (10th Cir. 1995); K&K
Constr. v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 575 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 1997); Zealy v. City of
Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528 (Wis. 1996). For a general discussion of the caselaw, see
Glen Sugameli, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: The Categoricaland Other
"Exceptions" to Liability for Fifth Amendment Takings of Private Property Far Outweigh
the Rule, 29 ENvTL. L. 939, 948-53 (1999).
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mentation would essentially turn every restriction into a taking,
since there would always be some portion of the property that,
standing alone, has no economic viability. 206 Further, it would
be inconsistent with the Court's longstanding recognition that
government can regulate land use for the public good.20 7 Yet to
allow landowners to strategically sell the unusable portion and
create takings claims would amount to the same thing, permitting them to accomplish with the mere transfer of property what
the Court has already indicated cannot occur when the parcel is
owned by one person. As indicated by Justice Breyer in Palazzolo, "to reward... such strategic behavior" hardly comports
208
with the takings clause purpose of "fairness and justice."
Nor is there anything in Palazzolo that suggests that the
mere transfer of property can be used to create takings in that
way. What Palazzolo says is that a purchaser, who buys property
already lacking economic viability, cannot be made worse off by
the act of transfer. 20 9 It is a far different matter to permit landowners to use the act of transfer to increase rights, which Palazzolo does not even suggest.
This conclusion finds further support in both of the rationales used by the Court in Palazzolo to reject the notice rule. First,
the Court emphasized that invalid enactments of regulations
cannot become valid by passage of time or title, nor can there be
an expiration date on the Takings Clause. 210 The point, therefore, was that regulations that are invalid when enacted, cannot
somehow become constitutional by mere passage of time. This
is quite different from saying that regulations that are valid
when enacted can become invalid by mere passage of title.
Second, the Court rejected the notice rule as necessary to
protect the original landowner's right to transfer, which would
be adversely affected if subsequent purchasers with notice lost

206. The Supreme Court emphasized this concern in Keystone, where it stated
that if property can be segmented for a takings analysis, such commonly accepted
zoning practices as setback requirements would constitute takings, since they prohibit building on a distinct portion of the property. See Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,498 (1987).
207. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
208. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 643 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Echeverria, supra note
4, at 11118-19 (stating that fears of strategic manufacture of takings claims is unwarranted).
209. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
210. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626.
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the right to challenge restrictions as takings. 211 This rationale
suggests that the appropriate frame of reference is a regulation's
impact when first enacted, and that subsequent transfers do not
diminish rights. Viewed another way, a purchaser's takings
claim is derivative of the owner's at the time the regulation is
enacted. Therefore, although the act of transfer cannot diminish
rights, neither can it expand rights beyond those held by the
owner when the restrictions were enacted. As such, rejection of
the notice rule in no way empowers landowners to manufacture
takings by strategic transfer.
In summary, Palazzolo's main impact with regard to Lucastype takings is in situations where the property, having no economic viability, is transferred to a purchaser with notice.
Whereas prior lower court cases suggested notice precludes a
taking claim, Palazzolo establishes that notice in such situations
does not preclude such a claim. 212 At the same time, Palazzolo
does not open the door to new takings claims arising from property transfers themselves. In particular, a purchaser of property
with no economic viability does not have a claim under Palazzolo
if the transfer itself created the problem, or if the seller had previously sold off the developable portion. In both of these instances, it would have been the landowner's action, and not the
government action, which resulted in the loss of economic viability.
V. THE PENN CENTRAL STANDARD AFTER PALAZZOLO

As indicated in the previous section, very few land use
regulations will constitute categorical takings under Lucas, a fact
affirmed in Palazzolo. At the same time, Palazzolo made clear that
even if a regulation falls short of denying all economic viability,
it might still constitute a taking under Penn Central.213 Moreover,
even though notice can remain a relevant consideration, notice
in and of itself does not preclude a taking under Penn Central, as
previously suggested by some lower courts. 214 As a practical
matter, therefore, the Court's decision in Palazzolo requires that
all land use restrictions be analyzed under the Penn Central

211. See id. at 627.
212. Compare, e.g., Store Safe Redlands Assoc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 726,
735 (1996) with Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626.
213. See Echeverria, supra note 4, at 11114.
214. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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215

test.

Despite this apparent mandate, the Court itself has never
provided much guidance on how the test is to operate or be applied.216 Penn Central acknowledged that the Court's takings jurisprudence has involved essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,
but then noted that
several factors.., have particular significance. The economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly,
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the government action. A "taking" may be more readily found when the interference can be characterized as physical invasion by
government, than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life
217
to promote the common good.
Stated as such, Penn Central seems to equate the third factor,
the character of the government action, with physical invasions,
which the Court has come to characterize as a form of categorical taking. 218 It also suggests, however, that broadly applicable
regulatory programs will only be takings in extreme situations,
depending on the other two factors. With regard to those factors, the Court gave limited guidance on what they mean, engaging in a lengthy discussion of previous cases, but in the end,
219
applying the principles with surprisingly little analysis.
215. Although this two-step analysis had appeared to be the standard after Lucas, where the Court clarified in a footnote that the Penn Central analysis was still
relevant for property that retained some economic viability, see Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 (1992), some lower courts after Lucas seemed to treat the "denial of economic viability" standard as the only relevant
test. See, e.g., Tex. Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d
1095, 1105 (5th Cir. 1996); Burnham v. Monroe County, 738 So. 2d 471, 472 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1999). That position is clearly incorrect after Palazzolo. See supra note
208 and accompanying text.
216. Commentators have often noted the highly ambiguous nature of the Penn
Central test. For a particularly critical assessment, see Echeverria, supra note 184, at
3; see also Blaine I. Green, The Endangered Species Act and Fifth Amendment Takings:
Constitutional Limits of Species Protection, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 329, 344-45 (1998);
David F. Coursen, The Takings Jurisprudenceof the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit, 29 ENVTL. L. 821, 826 (1999).
217. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1997).
218. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (characterizing physical invasions as categorical
takings). See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982) (requiring landlords to allow cable companies to place cables in rental properties a taking by physical invasion).
219. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136. The Court's identification of "interference
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Nonetheless, several basic propositions emerge from the
context of Penn Central regarding the economic impact and investment-backed expectations analysis. First, it is clear that restricting pre-existing rights does not in and of itself create a taking, even when resulting in the loss of a valuable property
interest. Penn Central itself involved such a situation, where
prior to the Landmark Law Penn Central possessed quite valuable air rights, removed by the Landmark Law. 220 The fact that
Penn Central was deprived of such preexisting rights was of little consequence in the Court's analysis. Further, the Court cited
with approval cases also involving deprivation of previously ex221
isting developmental rights.
Second, the Court also emphasized in its discussion that
substantial diminution in value is not enough by itself to constitute a taking.222 As an example, it cited the 75% diminution in
value in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,223 in which the Court nonetheless sustained the validity of zoning restrictions. 224 Although
Euclid is generally not considered a takings case, the Court's discussion of it in Penn Central suggests that broadly applied land
use restrictions can impose substantial economic loss and still
225
not be a taking.
The Court gave less insight into the meaning of interference
with investment-backed expectations, 226 although it suggested
this was the most important factor. 227 In upholding the Landwith distinct investment-backed expectations" apparently was based on a law review article by Professor Frank Michelman who discussed interference with investment expectations as an important dimension of the takings analysis. See
Michelman, supra note 188, at 1233-34. For discussions of the Michelman article as
the basis for the Court's use of that language in Penn Central, see Steven J.Eagle, The
Rise and Rise of Investment-Backed Expectations, 32 URB. LAW. 437 (2000); Bradford &

Breemer, supra note 79, at 453-59.
220. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.

221. See id. at 125, 131 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
222. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
223. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
224. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131. Lower courts have also recognized this
principle. See, e.g., Messer v. Town of Chapel Hill, 485 S.E.2d 269, 270 (1997)
("[M]ere diminution in value from the rezoning, even a substantial one, is not compensable.").
225. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125, 131.
226. A number of commentators have noted the ambiguous nature of the term

"investment-backed expectations." See, e.g., Echevarria,, supra note 184, at 6; Daniel
R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Takings Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215, 215

(1995); Oswald, supra note 172, at 106-17.
227. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 ("[Tlhe economic impact of the regulation

on the claimant, and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered
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mark Law, however, the Court emphasized that the law did not
interfere with the original purpose for which the terminal was
built nor with how it had been used for more than sixty-five
years. 228 Rather, the new law interfered with only prospective,
albeit previously permitted, uses. 229 This arguably suggests that
if a regulation does not interfere with the original purpose for
which the property was acquired and permits a reasonable return, there is no taking, no matter what changes might have occurred in the interim. Thus, although retention of property over
a period of time can easily be seen as re-investment, Penn Central
focused more on the original purpose for which the property
230
was acquired.
Prior to Palazzolo the Court gave little attention to the Penn
Central test, notwithstanding the Court in Lucas affirming the
test's continued relevance. 231 This gave only minimal guidance
to lower courts, which for the most part themselves have given
only scant attention to developing and applying the Penn Central
analysis. Although a few courts have attempted to flesh out
Penn Central in some meaningful fashion, 232 most lower courts
have applied it in only a generalized fashion or ignored it altogether. 233 This is in part explained by the Court's less-thanprecise articulation of what role the Penn Central factors were to
play, and how this role relates to the economic viability test. 234
with distinct, investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.").
228. See id. at 136.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 115, 135-36.
231. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 (1992).
232. See Fl. Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21, 32-43 (1999);
Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131, 1136 (11th Cir. 1992) (listing eight types of
questions that should have been answered for a meaningful application of Penn
Central to the facts of the case, then remanding to trial court).
233. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000); Tex. Manufactured
Housing Ass'n v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1105 (5th Cir. 1996); Burnham v.
Monroe County, 738 So. 2d 471, 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); JWL Investors, Inc. v.
Guilford County Bd. of Adjustment, 515 S.E.2d 715, 719 (1999); Zealy v. City of
Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Wis. 1990). See also Echeverria, supra note 184, at
944-45 (stating that many courts limit takings to total economic loss).
234. Not only are the Penn Central factors ambiguous, but shortly after Penn Central, in Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Court articulated a two-part taking test, stating
that a taking occurs if a restriction "does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests, or denies an owner economically viable use of his land." Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). The Court repeated this two-part formulation in a

number of taking decisions in the 1980s. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
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Despite the continued uncertainties that surround Penn Central, Palazzolo made clear that all land use regulations are subject
to it.235 In doing so, it added very little to any overall understanding of the test, but did arguably provide two illuminations.
First, while holding that notice of restrictions does not preclude
a takings claim, a majority of the Court, viewed such notice as a
relevant factor in analyzing the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations. 236 This position suggests that the
likelihood of a taking under Penn Central diminishes, but does
not expire altogether, as property is transferred subject to restrictions.
Second, the Court stated that application of the Penn Central
factors is to be informed by the purpose of the Takings Clause,
which is to "prevent government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole." 237 This language,
originally stated in Armstrong v. United States,2 38 has often been
quoted in takings cases, 239 and thus its use in Palazzolo is not
surprising. Yet it highlights that the ultimate purpose of the
Takings Clause generally, and the Penn Central test specifically,
is to reach a "fair and just" accommodation between the rights of
240
the public and the rights of individual landowners.
That being said, Penn Central and other cases indicate that
most land use regulations are valid, and it is only the exceptional case that should constitute a taking.2 41 The Court has consistently affirmed the principle that private property interests
are necessarily held subject to broader public interests, which
will often result in economic loss to landowners.2 42 As fre470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.

264, 295-96 (1981). This undoubtedly led to confusion on what role, if any, the Penn
Central test was to have. Although the Court in Lucas clarified the relationship of
the "economic viability" standard and Penn Central test, see 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8,
lower courts often continued to apply just the "economic viability" test.
235. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630-32 (2001).
236. See id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 637-45 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
237. See id. at 618 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
238. See Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
239. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389 (1994) (quoting Armstrong);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1997) (quoting Armstrong).
240. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-24 (quoting Armstrong).
241. See, e.g., Penn Central,438 U.S. at 123-28.
242. The Supreme Court early and often recognized the principle that private
land ownership is held subject to broader public rights. See Pennsylvania Coal Co.
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quently noted, such economic loss is part of the cost of doing
business in a regulated society. 243 In Palazzolo, the Court was
careful to affirm the general validity of land use restrictions,
244
even when they result in economic losses to landowners.
Thus, from a broad perspective the Court's regulatory takings
jurisprudence, including the Penn Central test, suggests that most
land use restrictions are constitutional, even when imposing
substantial economic losses.
Keeping in mind the guiding principle of a "fair and just"
accommodation, the rest of the article briefly reviews the three
basic regulatory scenarios under the Penn Central factors, which
concern the timing of regulation as it relates to development opportunities. Although the fact sensitive nature of the inquiry
and the need for "fairness and justice" in any particular case
make this analysis subject to some qualification, the following
subsection suggests that the first two scenarios below should
never be a taking under Penn Central. Only in the third scenario,
in which property is bought at a price reflecting full development potential, and is subsequently restricted, resulting in substantial economic loss, might a taking occur under Penn Central.
Even in this third scenario, most restrictions would be constituv. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("[a]s long recognized, some values are enjoyed
under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power"); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (explaining that private property interests must
at times "yield to the good of the community" for the sake of "progress"); Hudson
County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (private property limited by
other public interests, including exercise of police power "to protect the atmosphere, the water and the forests"); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) ("[A]ll
property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of
it shall not be injurious to the community."). A substantial amount of academic
commentary has also documented how the American legal tradition has long recognized that private property rights are not absolute, but are limited by broader
public interests. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, The Taking Clause: Principles or Politics, 34
BUFF. L. REV. 735, 751-52 (1985); Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation,
Not a Lockean Soliloquy: A Role for Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26
ENVTL. L. 1095, 1133-37 (1996); Rose, supra note 197, at 274-82.
243. The Court recognized this in Pennsylvania Coal where, in the context of introducing the concept of regulatory takings the Court stated that government could
hardly go on if it had to pay every time a regulation reduced the value of land. See
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. The Court has reiterated that concept, either explicitly or implicitly, in more recent cases. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (explaining that the landowner "necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time," by newly enacted
regulations).
244. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 620 ("[a] prospective enactment, such as a new zoning
ordinance, can limit the value of land without effecting a taking because it can be
understood as reasonable by all concerned").
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tional, but depending on the totality of circumstances, a taking
might be found.
A.

Low Development Potential Land Restricted After Purchase

Probably the easiest case for analysis under Penn Central is
where restrictions are placed on property with low development
potential, resulting in modest diminution in value. This might
occur where the property is only marginally suitable for development, or even if eventually suitable, has no current or anticipated development pressure that might inflate land value. As
such, the land is relatively inexpensive, and any restrictions
have minimal or modest economic impact.
Absent highly unusual circumstances, this scenario would
rarely, if ever, result in a taking. The Court has consistently
stated that reasonable regulations resulting in some adverse
economic impacts are not takings. 245 Moreover, the interference
with reasonable, investment-backed expectations is virtually nil
here. Thus, where environmentally sensitive lands are identified
at an early stage, prior to significant development potential, takings concerns should be minimal as long as some economic viability remains. In the case of agriculturally restricted land,
farming activity itself would be enough to ensure economic viability. 246 Other restrictions, such as limiting land to wetlands,
might require minimal development opportunity. In either instance, however, the fact that the restriction greatly limits future
development opportunities poses virtually no problem if imposed at a time when such opportunities were limited.
Importantly, even if subsequent events greatly enhance the
development potential of the land, there is still no taking if the
restrictions were in place prior to such enhancement. This scenario might occur where the restrictions were imposed prior to
when the land appreciated in value, and the owner is subsequently seeking an "upzoning" to a more intensive land use. Although refusal to upzone in such a situation might result in significant loss of potential appreciated value for the landowner,
this loss can hardly be viewed as a significant interference with
245. See supra note 171.
246. Courts have consistently held that farming is an economically viable use
property so as to avoid a categorical taking under Lucas. See, e.g., Christensen
Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161, 165 (9th Cir. 1993); Jafay v. Bd.
County Comm'rs of Boulder County, 848 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1993); Bell River Assocs.
Charter Township of China, 565 N.W.2d 695, 700 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).

of
v.
of
v.
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investment-backed expectations.
This conclusion likewise would be true if the restricted
property were subsequently sold to a purchaser, at a price reflecting the potential for more intensive development. Although
notice of a restriction does not preclude a taking claim, notice is
quite relevant in a takings analysis. In such a situation purchase
of the property with the restriction in place is just speculation on
a possible zoning change, which is certainly not the type of investment for which compensation is required. This assessment
is particularly true if the seller had no valid takings claim under
the above scenario. As discussed in Part IV, rejection of the notice rule in Palazzolo means that landowners may not be put in a
worse situation through land transfers, but does not mean that
landowners can strengthen takings claims by strategic transfers. 247 As a general matter, therefore, the Penn Central analysis
would rarely result in a taking when the regulation is enacted
and the property has low development potential, even if subsequent events greatly enhance the property's potential value.
B.

Low Development of Land When Acquired, High Development
When Restricted

A second and somewhat more difficult scenario is when
property is acquired with low development potential, which
then substantially appreciates in value before restrictions are enacted. Unlike the first scenario, a likely consequence of the restrictions in this scenario is a substantial diminution in property
value. Moreover, such a restriction would create a deprivation
of pre-existing and quite valuable development opportunities.
Taken together, these factors might at first appear to make a
strong case for a taking under Penn Central.
Despite the substantial diminution in value such a scenario
might cause, a substantial interference with investment-backed
expectations so as to constitute a taking is unlikely. As in Penn
Central, the original investment reflects low development potential; the down-zoning only interferes with opportunities subsequent to the investment. The lost appreciated value does not so
much reflect the investment of the landowner as a fortuitous
windfall from advancing development, much of it even created
by government itself through provision of infrastructure. 248 Al247. See supra text accompanying notes 187-97.
248. See E. George Rudolph, Let's Hear It for Due Process-An Up to Date Primeron
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though down-zoning in such a situation clearly has an economic
impact on the affected landowner, it likely does not amount to
the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations
contemplated by Penn Central. Indeed, Penn Central itself essentially involves this same scenario, in which previously permitted
development was eliminated, resulting in significant economic
impact, but not interfering with what had been the original expectation of the property owner.249
Penn Central's minimization of takings concerns in this
situation might be criticized on several grounds. In particular,
commentators have suggested that Penn Central incorrectly focused on the original investment, rather than the development
potential and value immediately before the restriction was imposed. 250 The argument goes that, by choosing to retain rather
than sell such assets, the landowner has in essence re-invested in
the land at the higher value. 251 Thus, the determination of interference with investment-backed expectations should use a later,
252
rather than earlier time frame.
There is some force to this argument, but it is far from compelling when seen from a broader perspective. As suggested
above, much of the appreciated value in such situations is typically not the result of actual investments by the landowner, but
from fortuitous windfalls from advancing development. This
trend is particularly true of environmentally sensitive land, such
as farmland, coastal zones, and wetlands, which often becomes
valuable because of its development potential totally apart from
any initiative by the landowner. For example, prime farmland is
often under significant development pressure, with consequential increases in land value due to these development pressures
Regulatory Takings, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 355, 364 (1988).
249. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1997) (stating there was no interference with investment-backed expectations because property could be used as it had been for the previous 65 years). For a more recent case

applying a similar analysis, see Fl. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Burgess, 772 So. 2d 540,
543-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that denial of a dredge and fill permit for
wetlands did not constitute a taking, since the wetlands in question were purchased
in 1956 for recreational purposes, and denial of the permit did not interfere with
continued recreational use of the property).
250. See William W. Wade, Penn Central's Economic Failings Confounded Takings
Jurisprudence,31 URB. LAW. 277, 284-85 (1999).
251. See id. at 301.
252. See id. ("[T]he appropriate measure of economic injury is the opportunity
foreclosed as a result of unforeseen regulation prohibiting the planned economic
use, not the cost of the land.").
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and unrelated to any action by the landowners themselves.2 5 3
Especially significant is the role of government in creating
the development value of such land. As suggested by various
commentators, government givings often add significant development value to private land. 254 For example, the very scheme
of restricting land use adds significant value to neighboring
property by minimizing the harms that might otherwise affect
landowners.255 Specifically, the increased value of environmentally-sensitive lands in alternative, more intensive land uses, in
part exists because residential development would be protected
from conflicting commercial and industrial development.256 Any
takings arguments based on diminution in value necessarily reflect property values largely enhanced by protective government
regulatory schemes.
Even more significant are government "givings" through
basic infrastructure support that makes land developable in the
first place. Through roads and other infrastructures, government in effect heavily subsidizes development, which in turn results in substantial appreciation of land value. 257 The increased
value of property between the time it is originally purchased
and when later development opportunities arise is often largely
attributable to such subsidies.25 8
For these reasons, the Penn Central focus on original investment, rather than subsequent development potential, makes
sense. "Fairness and justice" hardly require compensating landowners for loss of appreciated land value that is typically fortuitous to begin with, and, more often than not, is the result of government actions. In such a situation, restricting land use to what
had been the original investment expectation reflects a reasonable and fair "adjust[ment] [of] the benefits and burdens of eco253.

See A. ANN SORENSON ET AL., AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, FARMING ON

THE EDGE 7-16 (1997) (identifying and discussing twenty leading agricultural regions of country that are under significant development pressure).
254. See Private Property Rights and Environmental Laws: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Env't & Pub. Works, 104th Cong. 163-65 (1996) (statement of C. Ford
Runge, Professor, Dep'ts of Agriculture and Applied Economics, University of
Minnesota); Edward Thompson, Jr., The Government Giveth, ENVTL. FORUM,
Mar./Apr. 1994, at 22.
255. See DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN
PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 328-29 (2d ed. 1986).
256. See id.

257. See Thompson, supra note 254 (discussing substantial ways that government
givings" in form of infrastructure enhance value of private land).
258. See id.
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nomic life." 259
This analysis has particular force for protection of environmentally sensitive lands, which might have been acquired at a
time of low development potential, but were later restricted after
land value appreciated. Almost always such appreciation reflects government subsidies that make development both possible and attractive. Subsequent imposition of development restrictions that substantially reduce, but do not altogether
eliminate economic viability, should not be viewed as unfair to
landowners who fortuitously reaped appreciation after their investment. Indeed, to require compensation in such situations
can be viewed as making government pay twice, once through
infrastructure that enhances land value and once through payment of just compensation when government regulations dimin260
ish property value.
Furthermore, if the original owner in the above scenario
would not have a viable takings claim under Penn Central, subsequent purchasers from that owner after restrictions are imposed also would not have a viable claim. Once again, notice no
longer precludes such a claim, but it remains a relevant factor in
analyzing expectations under Penn Central.2 61 As such, the expectations necessarily reflect that the purchaser knew of the restrictions, and thus was speculating on an upzoning. More importantly, Palazzolo suggests that the rights of the purchaser are
derivative of the prior owner. 262 If, for the reasons stated above,
the prior owner would not have a takings claim, neither would
the subsequent purchaser with notice. For the reasons stated in
Part IV, a transfer with notice cannot be viewed as ever263
increasing rights that did not previously exist.
C. High Development Land Mhen Acquired and hen Restricted
A third scenario for analysis under Penn Central is where
someone purchases property at a price reflecting permitted development opportunities, which is then down-zoned resulting in
substantial economic loss. Unlike the previous scenario, in
259. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1997) (suggesting deference when government regulation is merely "adjusting the benefits

and burdens of economic life to promote the common good").
260. See Thompson, supra note 254, at 26.
261. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 632-36.
262. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-30 (2001).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 187-97.
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which the land appreciated in value after purchase, here the
purchase price itself reflects the full appreciation. Indeed, this
might occur as a simple variation on the previous scenario, with
the original owner selling the property shortly before, rather
than after, restrictions are imposed.
This is the strongest case for a taking under Penn Central,
and presents the most difficult analysis. In such situations, the
landowner's development expectations are arguably backed by
the purchase price, and the diminution in value resulting from
down-zoning is an interference so as to constitute a taking.
Moreover, unlike Penn Central, here the property was likely
bought for the purpose of pursuing the previously permitted
development, and thus the original investment expectations are
frustrated by the restrictions.
The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that even this
scenario will usually not constitute a taking, notwithstanding
the interference with purchase expectations. The Court has consistently affirmed the need to permit newly-enacted land use
regulations, despite inevitable interference with some purchase
expectations. 264 Zoning, for example, necessarily involves restricting previous development opportunities when first implemented, which inevitably will affect some recently purchased
property. Yet the Court, in consistently affirming the validity of
various zoning schemes, has never suggested that an interference with purchase prices in this manner would be unconstitutional. 265
This conclusion finds further support in the concept of
"regulatory risk," a concept that contributes to the reasonableness of any investment-backed expectations. 266 The Supreme
Court recognized this concept in Lucas, where it stated, "that the
property owner necessarily expects the use of his property to be
restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly enacted
264. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1994) (noting the authority of government to engage in land use planning even when it diminishes

property values); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027
(1992) (landowners should reasonably expect some newly enacted regulations that

affect land values); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding zoning
ordinance valid despite 75% diminution in value on some land); Pennsylvania Coal

Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("government hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law").
265. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding zoning ordinance valid despite 75% diminution in value on some land).
266. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
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by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers." 267 This
analysis builds on statements by the Court in other regulatory
contexts, in which it has strongly affirmed the idea that the risk
of regulation is part of economic life, including the distinct possibility of economic loss. 268 The Court has noted that this is particularly true with regard to activities that "[have] long been the
source of public concern and the subject of government regulation." 269 This, of course, is certainly true of the land development field, which has long been subject to government regula270
tion and, if anything, the trend is toward greater controls.
For this reason, reasonable investment expectations of
property based on development potential must necessarily include the possibility that tighter restrictions might be enacted,
depriving the owner of previous development opportunities and
resulting in a diminution of property value. 271 As a practical
matter, purchase prices should accordingly also be discounted
by the possibility of regulation. Similarly, at least with undeveloped property, any development expectations should be viewed
as contingent at best, with the possibility that government might
subsequently change previous zoning in order to further legitimate public interests.
For these reasons the clearest case for a taking under Penn
Central would be where the investment is based on actual devel272
opment expenditures, rather than speculation on future uses.
267. See id.
268. The Court has often stated that "[tihose who do business in the regulated
field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end." FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91
(1958); Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (quoting Darlington);
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986) (quoting Darlington).
269. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007 (1984).
270. See John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339, 36768 (1989) (noting the highly regulated nature of the land development field and
even greater trends in that direction).
271. Various commentators have also recognized the concept of "regulatory
risk" as playing a significant role in takings analysis. As noted by Frank Michelman, "regulation [is] an ordinary part of background risk and opportunity, against
which we all take our chances... as investors in property." Frank I. Michelman, A
Skeptical View of "Property Rights" Legislation, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 409, 415 (1995).
See also Humbach, supra note 270, at 367; Daniel Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215, 233-36 (1995).
272. See Eric Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 77, 134 (1995) ("[l1n the law of takings, a considerable difference exists between a regulation that interferes with a current land use, and one that bans a pro-
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In such situations there is a strong public policy that a landowner's expectations be protected. 273 Indeed, a strong argument
can be made that takings under Penn Central be limited to this
scenario, and that interference with expectations based on future, rather than current uses, would never be a taking under
27 4
Penn Central, since such expectations are contingent at best.
Under this approach restrictions on undeveloped land would
never be a taking even if the purchase price reflected previous
development potential, as long as some economic viability remained.
The Supreme Court, however, has implicitly indicated that
at least in some limited contexts interference with investments in
even undeveloped land might constitute a taking under Penn
Central.275 Yet it is clear under the totality of the Court's jurisprudence that the reasonableness of any investment-backed expectations must anticipate further restrictions on property that
eliminate previously existing opportunities and substantially
diminish property values. If nothing else, this strongly suggests
that, at least regarding future uses on undeveloped land, takings
under Penn Central are to be relatively rare exceptions based on
compelling facts.
When might this third type of scenario result in a taking
under Penn Central, where land is purchased at a price reflecting
spective land use.").
273. There would be little reason for property owners to invest resources to develop property if the government could later impose restrictions, without providing
just compensation, that would make such development investments worth substantially less. This is particularly important in the land development field, where the
development of property to meet market demand for particular uses often takes
substantial expenditures in a staged process. If developers are not secure that development expenditures will be protected, there would be an enormous chilling effect on land development. That, in turn, would greatly limit the production of
valuable "land resources," such as housing and commercial uses that create jobs
and produce essential goods and services. See Rose, supra note 197, at 268
("[Pleople are much more likely to plan carefully and work hard when they know
that the fruits of their labors will be secure to them in the form of property rights.").
274. See Humbach, supra note 270, at 365-66 (arguing that government restrictions should not constitute a taking when only interfering with potential uses of
property). See also Freyfogle, supra note 272, at 130 (suggesting protection of current, but not future uses). Although the Court in Penn Central did not expressly
limit this factor to interferences with established uses, the Court relied on an article
by Professor Frank Michelman in recognizing its relevance in takings analysis. See
Michelman, supra note 188. In discussing the concept, the Michelman article primarily emphasized its relevance to interferences with established land uses. See id.
at 1233-34.
275. See Michelman, supra notes 205 and 271.
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then-permitted development potential, and subsequently restricted causing a decrease in value? Any definitive answer is
impossible, of course, because the test itself is admittedly ad hoc
in nature and based on a complex of factors, which provides
significant flexibility but little predictability. Several broad outlines of what such a taking might look like might be ventured,
however, bearing in mind that any actual analysis must be based
on the particular facts of any case, and what "fairness and justice" would dictate.
First, as emphasized above, mere expectations based on
purchase price are insufficient by themselves to establish a taking, since there is a significant element of "regulatory risk" in
such situations. 276 This is particularly true with land, which has
long been a highly regulated field. Where government has
made representations about development, however, beyond current zoning, then expectations about continuation of existing development opportunities are more reasonable. 277 This would be
particularly true where government invited the purchase itself.
In such a situation "fairness and justice" would require that purchase expectations be protected. 278
Second, the economic impact of the restriction must be substantial before a taking is even possible, especially as measured
by the diminution in value. Again, the Court has indicated that
this alone cannot constitute a taking, 279 and has suggested that
even significant diminutions based on newly enacted restrictions
should not be a taking.280 For this reason lower courts have consistently upheld restrictions on environmentally sensitive land,
even when diminutions exceed 50% of the land value.281
276. See supra notes 271-72.
277. See, e.g., A.A. Profiles, Inc. v. Ft. Lauderdale, 850 F.2d 1483, 1488 (11th Cir.
1988) (finding a taking where landowner sought and received approval of development plan prior to purchase); Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 664 F.2d 99, 100
(5th Cir. 1981.) (finding a taking where the city granted a building permit before a
new ordinance passed).
278. This, of course, might be a classic case of estoppel, where government
would be estopped from enforcing newly enacted restrictions against a landowner
that it had encouraged to make a land purchase. See Town of Largo v. Imperial
Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571, 572-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
279. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.104,131 (1977).
280. See id. (citing 75% diminution in value in Euclid Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365
(1926), as not constituting a taking).
281. See, e.g., Nasser v. City of Homewood, 671 F.2d 432, 438 (11th Cir. 1982)
(finding a 53% diminution in value not a taking); Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1031 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding an 87% diminution in
value not a taking); Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 608 A.2d
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Yet, all else being equal, a substantial diminution in value
might bring a regulation closer to a Penn Central taking, especially where a landowner purchased land at a price reflecting its
full development potential. There is no automatic cut-off, since
the Court in dictum in Lucas stated that even a 95% diminution
28 2
in value only might be a taking under Penn Central. It seems
fair to say, however, that generally diminution in value must
substantially exceed 50% before any serious consideration is
given of a Penn Central taking, and should be closer to 90%.
This observation was made in a recent Court of Claims decision, Walcek v. United States,283 which the court held that a
59.7% diminution in value was insufficient to constitute a taking
under Penn Central.284 In reaching this conclusion the court reviewed a number of decisions from the Supreme Court, Federal
Circuit, and Court of Claims in which economic impact and
28 5 It noted that the
diminution in value had been considered.
Supreme Court several times has suggested diminutions "approaching 85 to 90 percent do not necessarily" constitute a taking.286 Similarly, the Court of Claims had generally "relied on
diminutions well in excess of 85 percent before finding a regulatory taking." 28 7 On the other hand, it noted that both the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit had rejected takings challenges
based on the degree of diminution in value present in the Walcek

case, which was about

60%.288

1377, 1386-90 (1992) (finding a 90% diminution in value not a taking). See generally
Freyfogle, supra note 272 (noting that in wetlands contexts, courts typically reject
takings claims even where diminution in value exceeds 50%). See Lucas v. South

Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 (1992).
282. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.

283. 49 Fed. Cl. 248 (2001).
284. See id. at 271-72.
285. See id.
286. Id. at 271 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (holding a zoning ordinance valid despite a 75% diminution in value)); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915) (finding no taking despite an 87.5% diminution).

287. Id. at 271 (citing Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 160
(1990) (finding a 99% diminution was taking), affd, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 48-49 (1994)) (finding a 92-100% diminution
was a taking); Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 340 (1992) (finding an 88%
diminution was a taking). See also Coursen, supra note 216, at 848 (stating that federal court of claims and federal circuit "seem to have evolved a de facto takings

threshold of roughly a ninety percent loss in value" in wetlands cases). But see Fla.
Rock Indus v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21, 43 (1999) (finding a taking when there
was a 73.1% diminution and the court perceived landowner as being singled-out to
bestow benefit to the public).
288. See id. at 271 (citing Concrete Pipe & Products, Inc. of California v. Constr.
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These observations are supported by other court decisions
that have also rejected takings challenges despite substantial
diminution in value. 289 Although, as noted earlier, a number of
courts prior to Palazzolo ignored the Penn Central analysis and
only applied the economic viability test, to the extent diminution
in value was considered, courts typically sustained restrictions
despite substantial economic impacts. 290
A third consideration in this balance is the final Penn Central
factor, the character of the government action. As noted above,
the apparent purpose of this as envisioned by Penn Central was
to distinguish physical invasions, which are inevitably takings,
from general regulatory measures that simply "adjust the burdens and benefits of economic life." 291 Though more general
regulatory measures might therefore still constitute takings in
extreme instances, courts give more deference to such government actions, especially when they are simply adjusting benefits
and burdens.
It might be argued, therefore, that implicit in the "character
of the government action" factor is some consideration of the
breadth or narrowness of the challenged restriction. The Court
itself has frequently noted that takings are less likely to be found
where restrictions are broadly applied across a class of landowners, thus ensuring some "average reciprocity of advantage." 292 In contrast, regulations that target only a few select
Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (finding no taking with a 46%
diminution)); Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210, 1213 (1981) (finding a 50%
diminution not a taking).
289. See, e.g., Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrausbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1031 (3d Cir.

1987) (finding that a property reduced in value from $495,600 to $52,000 was not
taking); Nasser v. City of Homewood, 671 F.2d 432, 438 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding a
53% diminution in value not a taking); William C. Hass & Co. v. San Francisco, 605
F.2d 1117, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding no taking with a 95% diminution in
value); Sierra Terreno v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 79 Cal. App. 3d 439, 443
(1978) (finding no taking with a 75% diminution in value); Wyer v. Bd. of Envtl.

Prot., 747 A.2d 192, 193-94 (Me. 2000) (finding no taking with a 50% diminution in
value); Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377, 138690 (1992) (finding no taking with a 90% diminution in value); Smith Inv. Co. v.

Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 259 (Utah 1998) (finding no taking with a 43% diminution
in value).

290. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
291. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.104, 124 (1977).

292. See Lucas v. South Carolina. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18 (1992);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987); Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 124; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
For general discussions of the role that "reciprocity of advantage" might play in
takings analysis, see generally Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of a Advantage and
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landowners are more problematic, since they tend to force a few
landowners to bear disproportionate burdens, and typically lack
reciprocal benefits that flow from more broadly applied regulatory schemes. 293 Indeed, although the Court itself has not directly equated "character of the government action" with
breadth of regulation, individual members of the Court, 294 as
295
well as lower courts, have occasionally done so.
Consideration of the breadth or narrowness of the challenged regulatory scheme also finds support in the governing
principle of not forcing some people alone to bear burdens, in
which in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole. This principle extends beyond the concept of regulatory breadth, yet there is no doubt that a scheme's breadth or
narrowness relates to fairness and justice. A narrow or selective
regulatory scheme, which in essence targets a few landowners
for disproportionate burdens, intuitively appears less fair and
just than broader regulatory measures. Not only are reciprocal
benefits less likely in such instances, but the perception exists
that regulated parties are being "singled out" to shoulder such
burdens. Conversely, broad-based regulatory programs not
only provide reciprocal benefits, but also help ensure that those
Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence,40 AM. U. L. REV.
297 (1990); Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the "Harm/Benefit" and "Average Reciprocity
of Advantage" Rules in a Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1449
(1997).
293. The Court's takings jurisprudence has long disapproved of regulations that
impose disproportionate burdens on a small number of people. In an early takings
case, the Court stated that the Fifth Amendment "prevents the public from loading
upon one individual more than his just share of the burdens of government." Id. at
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893). This same
theme is echoed in the frequently invoked language from Armstrong, in which the
Court stated that the Fifth Amendment is "designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole." Id. at Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1962). This
was more recently also affirmed in Nollan, in which the Court, in dicta, noted that
an otherwise reasonable exaction requirement would constitute a taking if it singled-out a landowner to remedy problems that he or she had not contributed to
more than others. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4
(1987).
294. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1071-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
"character of the government action" factor suggests there was no taking in Lucas,
since the regulatory scheme did not target a few landowners but was broadly
based).
295. See Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. C1. 37, 49 n.14 (1994) (finding a taking
more likely where government creates a "public benefit by burdening discrete private individuals").

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

burdens that do exist are distributed among a large number of
people.
Therefore, in analyzing whether restrictions in the third
type of scenario constitute a taking, consideration should be
given to the breadth or narrowness of the regulatory scheme. In
particular, restrictions that are imposed pursuant to a broad
regulatory program should require a greater economic impact
before a taking is found. Conversely, where a restriction singles
out a relatively small number of landowners for regulation, then
some lesser, though still substantial, economic impact might
constitute a taking.
What particular mix of the above factors should result in a
taking when property is bought with development potential and
subsequently down-zoned is, of course, not precise. It is fair to
say that the less likely a regulation could have been anticipated,
the greater the diminution in value, and the more limited the
regulatory target, the more likely a taking. However, there is
always a risk of regulation, with attendant diminution in land
value, so recognition of a taking, even in such a situation, requires unusual facts. For this reason most restrictions under this
third scenario, in which land is purchased at a price reflecting
high developmental potential, and then is restricted, should still
be constitutional.
IV. CONCLUSION

Takings law remains a mess. Indeed, if anything it is messier than ever after Palazzolo. By rejecting the notice rule, the
Court eliminated what had been viewed by many as one of the
"few bright lines" in an otherwise confusing area of law.296
Moreover, by affirming the two-prong Lucas/Penn Central test,
and remanding the case for consideration under Penn Central,
the Court sent a clear signal that all restrictions are subject to
what the Court itself acknowledges is an ad hoc and ambiguous
297
standard.
This state of affairs, at least on its face, also appears to create
heightened vulnerability for environmental land use regulation.
This fact is most apparent when property is acquired with notice
of a regulation and found to have no economic viability. While
previously lower courts had typically held that notice precluded
296. See Echeverria, supra note 4.
297. See Palozzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001).
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a takings claim, Palazzolo indicated that a taking could occur in
these contexts. 298 Although highly unusual, the possibility of a
regulation denying all economic viability is greatest with restrictions on environmentally sensitive land, which often requires
that land be left in its natural state.
Yet from a broader perspective the harm from Palazzolo is
quite limited, and, for the most part land use regulation in general, and protection of environmentally sensitive land in particular, should remain quite stable. First, if anything, Palazzolo affirmed that categorical takings under Lucas are limited to
extreme situations. 299 The Court's focus under this analysis was
not on what had been lost, but on what remained, and it did not
300 Furrequire much to be considered "economically viable."
ther, any concerns that rejection of a notice rule will lead to
"strategic manufacture" of takings are misplaced, since in such
situations the loss of economic viability would be attributable to
the landowner, rather than to government actions, and therefore
not compensable.
Second, most environmental land use restrictions should
continue to fare well under the Penn Central analysis, even after
Palazzolo. Although notice no longer precludes a taking claim, a
full reading of Palazzolo indicates that notice can be a factor in
analyzing the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations. 301 This alone adds a layer of protection as time
passes and transfers occur. More importantly, the basic Penn
Central test itself should rarely result in a taking. As shown by
an analysis of three separate development/ restriction scenarios,
the Penn Central standard permits substantial regulation of undeveloped land, even when interfering with previous development expectations and substantially diminishing value.

298.
299.
300.
301.

See id. at 627-30.
See id. at 630-32.
See id.
See id. at 632-36.
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